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Introduction
Terrorism is a recurring historical phenomenon.1 The Olympic Games have not been 
immune to acts of political violence. The global stage that the sport mega-event provides 
arguably makes the Olympics attractive to terrorists who seek to inflict maximum damage 
and fear or to maximize publicity for their campaigns. Extremist groups may attack the 
event not because they bear any particular grievance against the Olympic movement, but 
because of its potent symbolism in relation to their violent campaigns against the enemy.2 
The host government or other states or communities involved in the Olympics are typically 
the primary target of the attack.3 The impact of terrorism at the Olympics reaches beyond 
the event itself. The 1972 Munich Olympics, when Black September extremists killed five 
Israeli athletes, six Israeli coaches and a police officer, not only had a lasting impact on West 
German society,4 but coupled terrorism and the Olympics in popular consciousness and 
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provided an impetus for the development of the US government’s counterterrorism effort 
and Olympic security operations.5
While the year 1972 is a landmark in the intersections of terrorism and the Olympics, 
the events of 11 September 2001 have accelerated and amplified the course of security and 
terrorism issues at the Olympics. The current security context provides both an opportunity 
and a challenge for authorities to demonstrate their ability to defend themselves and their 
allies against the threat of terrorism. This security environment is characterized by what 
terrorism scholar Ronald Crelinsten calls ‘September 12 thinking’, which considers that 
terrorism is a new form of war which must be fought with different, far-reaching means.6 
September 12 thinking informs security responses surrounding the Olympics. The ever 
greater efforts to securing the Games are reflected in the exponential growth in Olympic 
security budgets, to the point where the Games now exhibit one of the world’s largest security 
operations outside of war.7 For example, senior security consultant Neil Fergus hailed the 
2004 Athens Summer Games as ‘the greatest security operation since Alexander the Great 
marched through Persia’,8 while political scientist Ying Yu has described the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics as ‘the largest peacetime security operation in history’.9
Terrorism and security have received less academic scrutiny than other aspects of the 
Games. Nearly a decade ago, sociologists John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter predicted 
that security issues ‘are likely to come more to the fore in production of sports mega-events’ 
and ‘will form a substantial research theme in future studies of sports mega-events’.10 They 
were correct. In recent years, research on terrorism and security at the Olympics and other 
major sports events has burgeoned. Contributions to the knowledge base have come from 
a range of disciplines and fields including history, sociology, criminology, political science, 
international relations, communication science, sport management and legal studies. It is 
timely to take stock of these contributions and identify how they inform, or can inform, 
intellectual and public understandings of terrorism and security at the Olympics.
The aim of this paper, then, is to examine the contemporary intersections of terrorism, 
security and the Olympics. This aim will be met through an examination of empirical trends 
in Olympic-related terrorism in the period 1968–2014, as well as a review and synthesis 
of contemporary and emerging research agendas. The broader literature on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism will be used to contextualize and interpret the identified trends and 
research agendas.
Terrorism is defined here as the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians 
or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims.11 The deliberate targeting of 
civilians is what distinguishes a terrorist act from other forms of political violence in which, 
for instance, military units are targeted. The Olympic-related attacks examined in this paper 
fit this definition because they (primarily) target non-combatants. An area of contention is 
whether the term ‘terrorism’ should apply to the actions of state bodies in the same way that 
it applies to the actions of non-state actors. The absence of state terrorism from orthodox 
accounts of terrorism has been subject to scholarly critique.12 Indeed, state terrorism has 
been far more prevalent throughout history and has taken a vastly higher death toll than its 
non-state counterpart.13 State terrorism, defined as acts or threats of politically motivated 
violence carried out by representatives of the state against civilians, is of particular import 
for the present purpose. As will be seen, the two deadliest Olympic-related terrorist attacks 
to date were carried out or sponsored by state actors. Moreover, the historical insight that 
the tactics that states use to combat terrorism can themselves resemble terrorism is echoed 
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in recent debates (discussed later in this paper) on the implications of security operations 
at the Olympics.
The Olympics, like other premier sports events, are thought to be vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks and have been portrayed as such in political and media discourse, especially in the 
post-9/11 era.14 The attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, which killed 130 people, have 
increased discussions on safety and security at major sporting events, including the 2016 
Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games and the bidding of Paris for the hosting rights to the 2024 
Olympic Games.15 In a series of coordinated attacks, three suicide bombers struck near 
the Stade de France, the country’s national sports stadium, in Saint-Denis, followed by 
suicide bombings and mass shootings at cafés, restaurants and a music venue in Paris.16 The 
first explosion near the stadium occurred while an international friendly football match 
between France and Germany was underway. Investigators believe the attacker had planned 
to detonate his explosives belt inside the stadium but did not get past the gates. The bomber 
reportedly had a match ticket but was turned away during a security check at the gate.17 Ten 
minutes after the first explosion, a second bomber, who had been lying in wait, detonated his 
suicide vest near the stadium. Another 23 min after the second explosion, a third bomber’s 
explosives belt detonated nearby.
The security considerations and actions of governments and organizing  committees 
are well documented. For example, the Olympic Strategic Threat Assessment 
 identified terrorism as the greatest threat to the security of the London 2012 Olympic 
and Paralympic Games, ahead of serious crime, domestic extremism and public 
disorder, and natural hazards.18 Security costs from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic 
Games budget exceeded £550 million.19 In a similar vein, declassified documents show 
that the United States and other governments have anticipated the possibility of a 
terrorist nuclear incident at events such as the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.20 The 
identification of terrorism as a major threat to the Olympics is reflective of what Ole 
Wæver and others have called securitization: the process by which an issue, having been 
labelled an existential threat, is moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm 
of emergency politics, where states can control and deal with it without the normal 
(democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making.21 According to media 
studies scholar John Tulloch, the mass mediation and political framing of the 
terrorism-Olympics nexus have become embedded in people’s routine daily knowledge, 
experiences and anxieties by preparing people for the possibility of terrorism and by 
normalizing the extraordinary measures designed to combat it.22
Terrorism at the Olympics cannot be fully understood, however, without reference to how 
terrorist actors portray the Olympics and other major sports events as legitimate targets. 
Consider, for example, Eric Rudolph’s bomb attack on the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, 
which was one of four separate attacks perpetrated by Rudolph between 1996 and 1998. 
Rudolph was driven by a complex set of overlapping motives. He believed that violence was 
necessary to stop abortion and he justified killing law enforcement officers who defended 
abortion rights. In an 11-page statement released after his guilty pleas, Rudolph described 
the bombings as being part of a fight ‘in the defense of the unborn’.23 He also stated his 
specific purpose in bombing Centennial Park:
Under the protection and auspices of the regime in Washington millions of people came 
out [to] celebrate the ideals of global socialism. Multinational corporations spent billions of  
dollars, and Washington organized an army of security to protect these best of all games. Even 
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though the conception and purpose of the so-called Olympic movement is to promote the 
values of global socialism, as perfectly expressed in the song ‘Imagine’ by John Lennon, which 
was the theme of the 1996 games – even though the purpose of the Olympics is to promote 
these despicable ideals, the purpose of the attack on July 27th was to confound, anger and 
embarrass the Washington government in the eyes of the world for its abominable sanctioning 
of abortion on demand.24
Rudolph’s plan was ‘to force the cancellation of the Games, or at least create a state of 
insecurity to empty the streets around the venues and thereby eat into the vast amounts of 
money invested’. For Rudolph, the Olympics were a legitimate target as it symbolized at an 
abstract level the righteousness of his cause and the evil of his adversaries. Other targets 
would have been equally suited to this purpose.25 Indeed, Rudolph committed three more 
bombings, none of which involved sports events.
Eric Rudolph has not been alone in framing the Olympics or other major sports 
events as a symbolic target for terrorism. Al Qaeda has publically framed major sports 
events as an attractive target. In 2012, Al Qaeda propagandist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri 
advocated ‘targeting human crowds in order to inflict maximum human losses’ in 
an article in Inspire, an online English-language magazine produced by Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).26 In the article, Al-Suri mentions several suitable 
targets including crowded sports arenas. A 2014 issue of Inspire discusses the strategic 
importance of attacking dense crowds and identifies several specific targets including 
horseracing events and tennis tournaments such as the US Open.27 With regard to the 
United Kingdom, the article notes:
You have the soccer (football) stadiums especially during Premier League and FA Cup matches. 
They have worldwide life [sic] media coverage. The best time is after the final whistle, when 
huge crowds leave the stadium and celebrate around the entrances.28
On other occasions explicit reference has been made to the Olympics in extremist rhetoric. 
In July 2013, Doku Umarov, leader of the Caucasus Emirate, declared his will to disrupt the 
2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, which lies on the western edge of the Caucasus Mountains. 
In a four-minute video posted on the pro-independence website kavkazcenter.com, Umarov 
called for all Muslims and his followers to use any methods, including violent ones, in order 
to achieve this goal:
They [Russia] plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our ancestors, on the bones of many, 
many dead Muslims, buried on the territory of our land on the Black Sea, and we as mujahedeen 
[warriors] are obliged to not permit that, using any methods allowed us by the almighty Allah.29
He continued: ‘I call on you, every mujahid, either in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan or on 
the territory of the Caucasus to use maximum force on the path of Allah to disrupt this 
Satanic dancing on the bones of our ancestors’.30 In doing so, Umarov lifted the moratorium 
on attacks on Russian targets outside the North Caucasus region that he had ordered in 
February 2012 because, according to Umarov, ‘unbelievers’ in Moscow had treated it as a 
sign of weakness and ‘only increased their persecution of peaceful Muslims’.31
Six months after the Umarov video, Vilayat Dagestan, one of the factions that make up 
the Caucasus Emirate, posted a video warning Russia to expect attacks at the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics. The video showed two men who allegedly perpetrated the 2013 suicide bombings 
in Volgograd (see Table 1). Their video statement says:
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If you hold the Olympics you will receive a present from us, for you [Mr. Putin] and all those 
tourists who will come over. It will be for all the Muslim blood that is shed every day around 
the world, be it in Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, all around the world. This will be our revenge.32
Determined to demonstrate its ability to host the Winter Olympics, Russia stepped up 
its security to an unprecedented scale. The country reportedly deployed more than 50,000 
police and soldiers to secure the event.33 Dmitry Chernyshenko, the president of the Sochi 
Winter Olympics Organizing Committee, described the city as ‘the most secure venue on 
the planet’, while also promising that the tight security measures would not detract from the 
atmosphere of the Games.34 Yet, critics argued that Russia’s efforts to secure the Olympics did 
impact the experiences of athletes and spectators, with Ishaan Tharoor, former senior editor 
at Time, calling it ‘the most anxiety-ridden and militarized Olympiad in recent memory’.35
Terrorism at the Olympics, 1968–2014
Data-sets on terrorism at the Olympics are inevitably partial and likely to display a 
degree of arbitrariness. Existing databases vary enormously in regard to their definitional 
parameters. For example, while some studies incorporate not only successful attacks but a range 
of terrorist threats and plots,36 others consider the security investments made to prevent 
terrorist attacks as part of (‘evidence’ for) the threat.37 This paper uses a narrower approach, one 
that focuses on Olympic-related terrorist attacks that were actually carried out. However, some 
conceptual difficulties inevitably remain. Criminologist Pete Fussey notes the complexity of 
determining what constitutes Olympic-related terrorism by pointing to complicating factors 
such as when a terrorist attack takes place in a host nation in the run-up to or during the 
Olympic Games without an apparent connection to the event, yet with considerable impact 
on Olympic security planning.38 Terrorism can also be ‘Olympic related’ in the sense that it 
targets members or symbols of the Olympic movement more broadly. The cases discussed 
below illustrate these complexities.
In order to identify empirical trends in terrorism at the Olympics, three major sources 
were combined: the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the National Security Archive’s 
digital material, and the Cold War International History Project’s digital archives. The 
starting point was the GTD, managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses of Terrorism (START).39 Its purpose is to enable researchers and analysts to 
increase understanding of terrorism by providing a comprehensive set of open-source data 
on incidents of domestic and international terrorism since 1970.40 For the present purpose, 
only GTD records which meet three criteria are included: (1) the violent act must be aimed 
to attain a political goal; and (2) there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate 
or convey some other message to a larger audience than the immediate victims; and (3) 
there must be a reported link to the Olympic Games or the Olympic movement (Olympic 
Committee members, athletes, etc.).
The GTD was searched for the period 1970–2014. All GTD database records for this 
period were searched using ‘Olympic*’ as the primary search term across all separate 
attributes of each incident record. Each incident report in the GTD includes 
approximately 75 coded variables that can be used for statistical analysis, for example the 
incident date, country, city, perpetrator, target, tactics used in the attack, types of weapon used, 
fatalities, injuries, and so forth.41 The GTD search returned 34 records. Each record was 
examined in depth and, based on the information provided in the GTD, 15 incidents were 
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excluded. The main reasons for excluding these records were irrelevance (where targets were 
non-Olympic-related sites such as ‘Olympic Airlines’, ‘Radio Station Olympica Stereo’, 
‘Olympic Plaza Building’, ‘Olympic Country club’, etc.), and lack of robust information 
to make an informed decision on the attack’s relation to the Olympics. Cases in which 
the political motivations or the connection with the Olympic movement could not be 
corroborated were excluded. As a result, the list omits some of the incidents that are mentioned in 
previous studies,42 such as an incident that occurred only days before the 2008 Beijing Olympics 
in the city of Kashgar in the Western Chinese province of Xinjiang. The incident, labelled a ‘terrorist 
plot’ by Chinese state media, killed 16 police officers and injured 16 others.43 Two men with suspected 
links to the Uyghur separatist movement reportedly drove a dump truck at a group of police officers 
and threw explosive devices. They attacked the survivors with knives and grenades. China stepped 
up security around the Beijing Olympics following the attack. However, exile groups and other 
critics accused the Chinese authorities of exaggerating and manufacturing the terrorist threat 
to justify indiscriminate arrests and repression in the region.44 Foreign tourists who witnessed 
the incident provided a conflicting interpretation by stating that the attackers appeared to be 
paramilitary officers, not activists.45
The Olympic-related terrorist attacks identified from the GTD were corroborated through 
an analysis of the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project’s 
digital materials, again using ‘Olympic*’ as the primary search term.46 Three additional 
cases that are not registered in the GTD were identified from these archives. Table 1 lists 
the final sample of 22 cases.
What does the information conveyed in Table 1 reveal about empirical trends in terrorism 
at the Olympics? First of all, it shows that since 1968 there have been a number of attacks 
directly and indirectly related to the Olympic Games. This includes three lethal attacks in 
host cities during the competition: Munich 1972, Atlanta 1996 and Beijing 2008. The over-
whelming majority of attacks (19 in total, or 86%) occurred outside of competitions and 
targeted a diverse range of victims including officials, athletes, tourists, venues, spectators 
and local populations. This finding suggests that, overall, the locations of the Olympic Games 
are quite safe with regard to terrorism.47 Terrorist attacks on the Olympics are relatively rare 
compared to attacks on other types of targets.48 Moreover, Table 1 indicates the spatial and 
temporal displacement of attacks,49 a process that appears to have been caused at least in part 
by the intensified security measures at Olympic venues. A similar displacement process has 
been observed in other forms of sports-related violence including football hooliganism.50
Secondly, the two most lethal terrorist attacks in the history of the modern Olympic 
Games were acts of state terrorism: the Tlatelolco massacre in Mexico in 1968, and the 
bombing of Korean Air flight 858 in 1987. The 1968 Olympics in Mexico City stand out 
because the Mexican government used the international attention of the Olympic Games 
to justify suppressing the nascent student movement and framing them for attacking police 
officers to initiate the crackdown that led to the Tlatelolco massacre.51 Mexico pursued 
the 1968 Olympic bid as a unique opportunity to herald the nation’s coming of age.52 
Increasingly concerned about the effect the student protests would have on the Games and 
on the country’s international reputation, the Mexican government engaged in flagrant 
repression against organized student actions before the Olympics, culminating in a public 
massacre that left more than one hundred student and civilian protesters dead. Nineteen 
years later, on 29 November 1987, Korean Air flight 858, which was flying from Baghdad 
to Seoul, exploded mid-air upon the detonation of a bomb planted by two North Korean 
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Table 1. olympic-related terrorist attacks, 1968–2014.
year Country fatalities Description
1968 Mexico official death toll 
unknown; estimat-
ed at 100–300
Ten days before the beginning of the 1968 olympics in Mexico 
City, Mexican officials shoot and kill an unknown number of 
student and civilian protesters in Tlatelolco, Mexico City
1972 West Germany 17 Black september kidnaps and murders 11 Israeli olympic team 
members (five athletes and six coaches) during the 1972 Munich 
olympics. five of the eight perpetrators and one West German 
police officer were also killed during the attack and subsequent 
hostage situation
1976 Barbados 73 shortly after take-off a bomb explodes on Cubana flight 455 
killing all 73 people aboard, including 24 members of the Cuban 
fencing team
1983 el salvador 1 José larios Guerra, former president of the salvadoran olympic 
Committee and retired army Colonel, is assassinated by gunmen 
with suspected ties to the farabundo Marti national liberation 
front
1986 netherlands 0 ‘Into the Blue Commando of the revolutionary Cells’ claims 
responsibility for bombing the headquarters of the 1992 candi-
dature committee in amsterdam in protest against amsterdam’s 
bid for the 1992 olympics
1987 Israel 0 Tear gas assault on Jewish olympic Games celebration
1987 south Korea 115 Korean air flight 858 explodes in mid-air upon the detonation of 
a bomb planted by north Korean agents
1992 spain 0 euzkadi Ta askatasuna (eTa) is suspected in an arson attack on 
a hotel near the olympic village two months before the 1992 
Barcelona olympics
1992 spain 0 The Grupo de resistencia antifascista primo octobre (Grapo) 
bombs a gas pipeline in Catalonia the day before the opening 
ceremony of the 1992 Barcelona olympics
1996 Colombia 1 a russian olympic cyclist is kidnapped and killed by the revo-
lutionary armed forces of Colombia (farC). The cyclist was on 
a transcontinental bike tour towards the 1996 atlanta summer 
Games. his body was found a year later near the panama border
1996 united states 2 eric rudolph bombs atlanta’s Centennial park during the 1996 
atlanta olympic Games, killing two and injuring more than 110 
others
1997 Greece 0 The Greek olympic Committee is bombed by members of the 
anti-authority Group
2004 Greece 0 a group using the names of the mascots of the 2000 athens 
olympics, phevos and athena, claims responsibility for fire-
bombing two environment Ministry trucks during IoC meetings 
in athens
2005 spain 0 eTa claims responsibility for a car bomb attack outside the 
pieneta track and field complex used to promote Madrid’s bid to 
host the 2012 olympics. The attack comes less than two weeks 
before Madrid’s bid to host the Games
2006 Iraq 3 (at least) The president of Iraq’s olympic Committee, ahmed al-hejea, 
its secretary-General, amr abdel Jabbar, the head of Iraq’s 
taekwondo federation, Jamal abdel Karim, the head of water 
sports, saeb al-hakim, and dozens of other officials and athletes 
are abducted in a series of kidnappings between July and 
December 2006. an unspecified number of victims are killed or 
remain missing
2008 China 0 an improvised explosive device is found in Beijing’s Qinhuang-
dao stadium where the olympic football matches are to be held
2008 China 2 a knife-wielding assailant murders an american businessman 
and injures his wife and their tour guide. Their son-in-law was 
the coach of the us men’s volleyball team
2008 China 3 Two bombs explode on Chinese buses in Kunming, yunnan 
province, less than three weeks before the Beijing olympics. The 
Turkistan Islamic party claims responsibility for the bombings 
but Chinese authorities reject this claim
(Continued)
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operatives who then swallowed cyanide capsules (although only one actually died). The 
attack killed all 115 people on board. It appears that North Korea had wanted to destabilize 
the South Korean government, disrupt its upcoming parliamentary elections and frighten 
international teams from attending the 1988 Seoul Olympics.53
These two acts of state terrorism collectively killed at least 215 people, more than one and 
a half times as many as all other attacks combined (139 casualties).54 Fatal Olympic-related 
terrorist attacks are rare, indicative of which is that nine attacks, or 40 per cent, produced 
no casualties; yet, state terrorism tends to be far more lethal than non-state terrorism. With 
regard to the latter, four attacks that stand out in terms of their high fatality rates are: the 
bombing of Cubana flight 455 in 1976 (73 casualties); the attack on the Israeli team during 
the 1972 Munich Olympics (17 casualties, including five perpetrators) and the two suicide 
bombings in Russia in 2013 (19 and 17 fatalities, respectively, including two perpetrators).
Thirdly, while the Olympic Games are a mega-event that offers terrorists a global stage 
for communicating their political causes, terrorist actors who target the Games are typically 
grounded in particular localized sociopolitical contexts.55 This is evident, for instance, in the 
attacks in Spain by anti-fascist and nationalist/separatist groups, in Russia by nationalist/
separatists and Islamist extremists, and in the United States by a pro-life activist opposing 
US government policy on abortion. These examples indicate that terrorist activity around 
the Olympics has involved myriad forms and is characterized by the ideological diversity 
of the actors implicated in the attacks.56 This finding is consistent with historical research 
which shows that terrorism exists only in a cultural and historical context.57
Finally, Figure 1 shows that there is no consistent change in the frequency of 
Olympic-related terrorism over time. While Figure 1 indicates a clustering of attacks in 
the period 2004–2013, it should be stressed here that Olympic-related attacks are atypical 
events that heavily influence fatality and temporal trend statistics. We should therefore 
Table 1. (Continued)
year Country fatalities Description
2011 pakistan 1 unknown gunmen kill abrar hussain, three-time olympic boxer 
and Deputy Director of the pakistan sports Board, as he leaves 
the ayub stadium in Quetta
2012 libya 0 assailants kidnap the president of libya’s olympic Committee, 
nabil al-alam, in Tripoli. he is later released
2013 russia 19 a suicide bomber detonates at a train station in Volgograd. 
Vilayat Dagestan claims responsibility for the attack, framing it 
as a warning ahead of the 2014 sochi Winter olympics
2013 russia 17 a suicide bomber detonates on a trolley bus in Volgograd. 
Vilayat Dagestan claims responsibility for the attack
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Figure 1. olympic-related terrorist attacks, 1968–2014.
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exercise caution when seeking to establish patterns in Olympic-related terrorism 
over time. Olympic-related terrorist attacks can be considered ‘black swan’ events: 
low-probability and high-consequence events that are difficult to pattern, predict or 
prevent. According to risk engineering scholar Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a black swan 
event has three attributes: it lies outside the realm of regular expectations; it carries an 
extreme impact; and, despite its outlier status, retrospective explanations are created 
for its occurrence, seemingly making the event explainable and predictable.58 In this 
context, there appears to have been a semiotic shift in security and risk governance 
which links into the cultural dimensions of living with low-probability, high-conse-
quence events after 9/11.59 As will be shown later in this paper, the Olympics are one 
site where authorities seek to construct and manage the risk of terrorism through highly 
dramatized security displays. Rather than mere retrospective predictability, security 
governance at the Olympics and other major sports events involves prospective risk 
management aimed at pre-empting and minimizing the probability of terrorism.60 This 
issue has received significant scholarly attention in recent years. It is to the growing 
body of research on the intersections of terrorism, security and the Olympics that the 
paper now turns.
Contemporary Research Agendas
A growing body of scholarly research examines various aspects of the intersections of ter-
rorism, security and the Olympics. These studies stem from a range of disciplines and fields 
of study and draw on different epistemological, ontological and theoretical perspectives. 
Within this literature, a number of established and emerging themes can be distinguished.
Media Representations of Terrorism at the Olympics
Media discourses about terrorism and security at the Olympics have been occupying schol-
ars for well over a decade. This research highlights how such media discourses are tied to, 
and products of, broader geo-political ideologies. Thus, sociologists Michael Atkinson and 
Kevin Young have critiqued how media coverage of the 2002 Salt Lake City Games, the 
first post-9/11 Olympics, became an integrated media campaign to align particular ideas 
about global insiders and outsiders in the ‘war on terror’.61 Their more recent work shows 
the mediated construction of the Olympics as political war zones.62 Their comparison of the 
2002 Salt Lake City Games with subsequent Games suggests an important trend in media 
representation of terrorism and security at the Olympics:
Whereas the mediation of terror at the Salt Lake City Games contained a relative balance of 
the selling of fear and the assurance of security through highly descriptive accounts, today 
what seems to be more commonplace is the simple reminder that everyone should be fearful 
of every possible threat, contingency and instance of violence imaginable.63
Other studies have arrived at similar conclusions.64 In their analysis of Australian media 
reporting on terrorism and sport during the period 1996–2001, sport management 
scholars Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor found that the media coverage created 
‘hegemonic tropes’ that reinforced the government’s counter-terrorism policy, fuelled public 
fears about terrorism, and portrayed sport as a signifier of defiance against terrorism and its 
attempts to strike at the western way of life.65 A recent study by media and communication 
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scholars Moran Yarchi, Ilan Tamir and Yair Galily focuses on international media coverage 
of the authorities’ reaction to terrorist attacks or threats targeting sports events, including 
the Olympics.66 Similar to Toohey and Taylor, they found that the international media 
generally expressed uncritical support for the authorities and their counter-terrorism 
actions. As such, the media acted as a unifying arena and rallied around the political actors 
facing the challenge of terrorism.67
Public Perceptions of Terrorism and Security
A related research theme is spectators’ and public perceptions of terrorist threats at the 
Olympics. Kristine Toohey’s work on the risk perceptions of 2004 Athens Olympic Games 
attendees is groundbreaking in this regard.68 Toohey shows that while the majority of 
attendees displayed tenets of risk aversion and engagement with a discourse of fear, and 
took for granted the increased security measures, they did not consider terrorism to be a 
major deterrent or threat to their safety during the Games. Moreover, some spectators were 
committed not to let the risk of terrorism overshadow their enjoyment of the Olympics, 
displaying resilience, resistance and indifference to potential terrorist threats.69 Toohey 
uncovered a range of emotional responses to terrorism threats including both fear- and 
anger-related attitudes. Gender was an important factor influencing attendees’ perceptions, 
with women’s comments being more fear-related and indicating higher perceived risk, while 
men’s comments were more likely to be associated with optimism and lower perceived risk.70
Toohey and Taylor’s work suggests that the risk aversion that pervades Olympic security 
operations and, more specifically, what Olympic organizers fear will or might happen, is at odds 
with attendees’ constructions of risk and fear.71 This disconnect also comes to the fore in recent 
studies that explore the perceptions and planning of event organizers.72 Toohey and Taylor point 
to the prospect of government and Olympic organizers overreacting and amplifying the risk, and 
raise the need to work towards ensuring that spectators have a positive and safe experience.73 
Recent research has extended these insights into a full-blown critical socio-historical analysis 
of security and surveillance at the Olympics, as discussed below.
Security, Surveillance and its Consequences
One of the challenges Olympic organizers face is the need to balance the requirements of 
security and public safety with the festive and convivial nature of the Games. In a review of 
Olympic security operations during the period 1972–1994, Guy Sanan writes that ‘Olympic 
security operations not only occur in a democratic context where civil liberties and rights 
have to be strictly respected, but they also cannot spoil the joyous festival atmosphere, 
which is so special to the Olympic Games’.74 Sanan notes that Olympic security should be 
both comprehensive and unobtrusive, and posits this as one of the defining characteristics 
of Olympic security.75
International research shows that in the twenty-first century this ‘defining 
characteristic’ has receded well into the background as progressive securitization and 
expanding notions of risk have taken hold. Historical studies document the lasting impact of the 
1972 Munich Olympics terrorist attack on the Olympic movement’s security considerations and 
planning.76 The 1976 Montreal Summer Games constituted a turning point in Olympic 
history as the Games’ first highly visible security operation.77 According to historical 
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sociologist Dominique Clément, the Montreal Olympics laid the foundation and set a 
precedent for high security investment that has since become the standard for the Olympics, 
in spite of being ‘based largely on imagined threats’.78 Clément further shows that the 
Montreal Olympics had long-term implications for Canadian law enforcement as the 
security operation produced new resources and inter-agency links that were only made 
possible as a result of hosting the Games.
A series of critical investigations carried out in the past decade show the broader 
applicability and implications of the issues raised by Clément. This nascent field 
demonstrates the central role of security in Olympic planning and, more specifically, the 
pervasive aspirations of securitization and the ever increasing range of surveillance and 
control measures. This broad shift towards a ‘total security’ model has been examined from 
a range of disciplinary, theoretical and methodological perspectives. Lack of space prevents 
a discussion of the full breadth and depth of this work here. Instead, it is possible to identify 
at least three areas of consensus from this recent literature.
Firstly, Olympic security planning has become increasingly standardized across time 
and space since the 1976 Montreal Olympics.79 The generation of post-9/11 uncertainties 
has further escalated the scale, intensity and scope of Olympic security practices, which 
both express and extend contemporary developments in global security governance. The 
Olympics are discursively constructed as ‘spaces of exception’ wherein aggressive security 
and surveillance measures are justified to mitigate and prevent any potential or actual secu-
rity risks.80 As such, the Olympics, like other major sports events, serve as an opportunity 
for the authorities to introduce security measures that would be more difficult to justify 
in normal circumstances.81 Yet, the convergence and transferability of Olympic security 
strategies across time and place impacts unevenly on their hosts as they are mediated 
by localized conditions and processes, such as local security vernaculars and the scale of 
existing security infrastructures.82
Secondly, a combination of factors drives the global standardization of Olympic security. 
The governance asserted by the IOC as a knowledge broker is particularly noteworthy in this 
regard.83 Broader processes of transnational and multi-agency collaboration and knowledge 
transfer are also centrally implicated in this process. Crucially, these processes transcend 
public/private and civilian/military boundaries. Research shows the proliferating range and 
scale of transnational collaborations and networks in security governance at the Olympics, 
which include a range of private sector actors such as security consultancy and technology 
companies.84 Interactions between these actors, which include regular expert conferences, 
knowledge exchange programmes and test events, not only serve to institutionalize Olympic 
security discourses and practices, but also provide a space of experimentation to develop, 
refine and rehearse (the integration of) surveillance and control technologies.85
Thirdly, it is broadly agreed that Olympic security arrangements can endure long after the 
event is over. Post-event security legacies are now a strategic issue in Olympic security planning.86 
Security legacy has evolved into an explicitly articulated component of the Olympic business 
plan ‘intended from the outset to capitalize on an opportune moment’ in order to accelerate the 
expansion of security capabilities and surveillance infrastructures.87 The intended and 
unanticipated security legacies are multifaceted. In addition to technological, informational 
and knowledge legacies, they include the endurance of attitudes about security and surveillance 
whereby the Olympic ‘state of exception’ can become normalized.88 Another major security 
legacy is the reconfiguration of the physical environment both during and after the 
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Olympics, with the Games acting as a catalyst for the re-making of urban security and 
socio-spatial architectures.89 Examples include urban clearing programmes (e.g. forced 
relocations) and efforts to cleanse or civilize urban space through intense regulation and 
control.90 These issues raise critical concern regarding social polarization, inequality and 
civil liberties. Recent research highlights the potential for the Olympics to exacerbate social 
inequalities and undercut democratic principles and practices in the name of keeping the 
Games safe,91 the decline of local control over urban environments in Olympic cities,92 
and the risk of function creep,93 among other issues. At the same time, the Olympics can 
have the unanticipated legacy of revitalizing and mobilizing activist networks which seek 
to resist the securitization of the public sphere and create spaces of dissent within and 
beyond Olympic events.94
Conclusion
This study has set out to examine the historical and contemporary intersections of 
terrorism, security and the Olympics. The paper indicates the need to bring state terrorism 
into the analysis of terrorism at the Olympics. The empirical data presented in this paper 
underline the significance of state terrorism in this context: the two deadliest terrorist 
attacks in the history of the modern Olympic Games were perpetrated or sponsored by 
representatives of the state against civilians. This finding should be viewed within its broader 
social and historical context; namely, that throughout history state terrorism has taken a 
vastly higher death toll than its non-state equivalent. The data further show the spatial and 
temporal displacement of attacks, with the bulk of attacks taking place outside of Olympic 
competitions and away from host cities, as well as the diverse ideological and cultural 
contexts of the violence.
The diverse body of research surveyed in this paper indicates that rather than taking the 
nature, causes and subjectivities of terrorism as the primary locus of investigation, the recent 
literature focuses on external representations of, and responses to, terrorism. An emerging 
field of critical research is concerned with security and surveillance at the Olympics. This 
research opens up new lines of inquiry by drawing critical attention to both intended and 
unanticipated security legacies of the Olympics, including the wider social implications of 
Olympic security operations. In so doing, it paves the way for future critical work on the 
intersections of terrorism, security and the Olympics.
An important policy implication of this historical and sociological research concerns 
what historians Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin describe as the need to avoid fuelling 
terrorism while claiming to fight it.95 Olympic history offers some lessons here. Terrorism 
at the Olympics is not a new phenomenon and is not confined to a particular ideology, such 
as radical Islamism. Yet, the extent to which terrorist activity has targeted the Olympics 
in the past is rather limited. At the same time, Olympic security operations have evolved 
from a relatively low-key approach to an expansive security regime in which protection 
from terrorism is a key security concern for local organizing committees and dealt with as 
such. This security regime, which generally developed since the 1972 Munich Olympics and 
the 1976 Montreal Olympics and whose development accelerated since 9/11, has become 
increasingly standardized and globalized. The recent scholarship on the security 
legacies of the Olympics, which have become increasingly normalized, foregrounds this 
development and illustrates some of the tensions that exist between liberal democracy and 
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counterterrorism. Here, as in counterterrorism more broadly,96 a key question is how the 
securitization of, and response to, terrorism can be balanced with democratic principles 
and respect for human rights and civil liberties.
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